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Dahlmeier: Contempt:
Abatement of Purpose as a Defense in Civil Proceedings
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XXMI

CONTEMPT: ABATEMENT OF PURPOSE AS A DEFENSE IN
CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
Wilkes v. Revels, 245 So. 2d 896 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1970)
On January 7, 1964, petitioner was ordered by respondent to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt for noncompliance with a court order
to make child support payments. When he failed to appear to adjudicate the
directive, a warrant of attachment for contempt was issued. Petitioner was
taken into custody in May 1966, and he subsequently moved to quash the
warrant because the children had reached age twenty-one. The motion was
denied and a hearing set on the order. Prior to the hearing, however, petitioner and his former wife executed a stipulation of settlement that was
incorporated into an order entered by the circuit court on May 21, 1908.
Petitioner failed to comply with the order of May 21 and, on motion by his
former wife, the court issued an order directing him to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt. Petitioner then filed a suggestion for a
writ of prohibition to restrain respondent from proceeding with the contempt
action. The petitioner contended that when the children attained their majority, the circuit court lost subject matter jurisdiction to utilize its contempt
power to enforce child support payments. The First District Court of Appeal
granted the writ and HELD, a court loses subject matter jurisdiction to hear
contempt proceedings after the children reach majority because the purpose
and justifitation for the remedy have expired."
Contempt proceedings have long been utilized in Florida to enforce support orders for minors,2 the delinquent father being allowed to purge himself
of his contempt by paying the arrearages.3 The issue of whether contempt proceedings are a proper remedy after the children reach majority, however, is
one of first impression in Florida and there are few cases on point in other
jurisdictions. Two landmark decisions by the Oklahoma supreme court provide the basis for most foreign decisions recognizing abatement of purpose as
a defense to contempt proceedings arising from child support cases. In the
first, McCartney v. Superior Court,5 the court held its jurisdiction to punish
a default in support payments by contempt was derived from the Oklahoma
divorce statute.6 Since the divorce statute provided only for orders concerning
minor children, the Oklahoma court ruled as a matter of law that its jurisdiction to enforce the orders by punishment for contempt terminated when
the children reached majority.7
1. 245 So. 2d 896, 898 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 247 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1971).

2. E.g., Dykes v. Dykes, 104 So. 2d 598, 600 (3dD.CA. Fla. 1958).
3. "[T]he accused carries the keys of his prison in his pocket." In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d
874, 879 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
4. 245 So. 2d 896, 897 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 247 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1971).
5. 187 Okla. 63, 101 P.2d 245 (1940).
6. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1277 (1961). The statute provides that when a divorce is
granted "the court shall make provision for guardianship, custody, support and education of the minor children ....
7. McCartney v. Superior Court, 187 Okla. 68, 101 P.2d 245 (1940). The court re-
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After McCartney the case of Lowry v. Lowry8 established the position of
the Oklahoma court even more dearly. There, the court indicated that the
proper remedy to enforce a child support order was civil contempt since civil
contempt proceedings were "for the private benefit of a party or for the sole
purpose of coercing the payment of money to a private individual."9 In
cases involving child support payments, the court found the purpose of civil
contempt to be protection of minor children. Reasoning that since civil
contempt proceedings terminate when the purpose is abated, the court held
jurisdiction to enforce child support payments through contempt proceedings
was lost when the children reached majority.1 0 The reasoning of the Oklahoma court in Lowry has been adopted in virtually every jurisdiction, including Florida, which refuses to allow contempt proceedings to enforce child
support payments after the child reaches majority."
Some jurisdictions have refused to follow this reasoning. 2 In State ex tel.
Casey v. Casey' s the trial court issued an order to show cause why the defendant should not be held in contempt for failure to make child support
payments in compliance with an earlier directive. The defendant filed an
affidavit stating that subsequent to the entry of the earlier order
requiring him to contribute to the support of his children, all the children
had reached majority. Notwithstanding his affidavit, the trial court found
him guilty of contempt. The Oregon supreme court affirmed 14 basing its decision solely on the state's criminal contempt statute, which contained an
express provision allowing contempt proceedings to enforce the payment of
alimony.1 Thus, Casey and Lowry are readily distinguishable. Lowry explidly stated that the nature of the contempt was civil; 16 whereas, the Casey

court termed the contempt criminal.17 The primary purpose of the criminal
contempt proceedings in Casey was not the protection of minor children but
the punishment of a disrespectful defendant. s When the defendant failed
jected the contention that jurisdiction continued to allow the court to coerce payments
that became due prior to the child's reaching age twenty-one.
8. 189 Okla. 650, 118 P.2d 1015 (1941).
9. Id. at 651, 118 P.2d at 1016.
10. To obtain relief, the wife must institute a separate proceeding in which the balance
due may be determined and execution issued. Id. at 652, 118 P.2d at 1016.
11. Corbridge v. Corbridge, 230 Ind. 206, 102 N.E.2d 764 (1952); Leider v. Straub, 2,0
Minn. 460, 42 N.W.2d 11 (1950); Sides v. Pittman, 167 Miss. 751, 150 So. 211 (193); Dawson
v. Dawson, 71 Wash. 2d 66, 426 P.2d 614 (1967); Halmu v. Halmu, 247 Wisc. 124, 19 N.W.2d

317 (1945).
12.
13.
14.
15,

See, e.g., State ex rel. Casey v. Casey, 175 Ore. 828, 153 P.2d 700 (1944).
Id.
Id.
2 ORE. CoMP. LAws ANN. §11-501 (1940) provides: "The following acts or omissions,

in respect to a court of justice, or proceeding therein, are deemed to be contempts of the
authority of the court ....
Disobedience of any lawful judgment, decree, order, or process of the court, including judgments, orders, and decrees for payment of suit money,
alimony .... "
16.
17.
18.

189 Okla. 650, 651, 118 P.2d 1015, 1016 (1941).
175 Ore. 528, 386, 153 P.2d 700, 702 (1944).
Id. at 387, 153 P.2d at 708; see Demetree v. State, 89 So. 2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1956)
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to comply with the court order he was guilty of criminal contempt and the
children's reaching majority had no effect on his unlawful conduct. 19 Civil

are
contempt, on the other hand, is remedial, in nature and the proceedings
20
abated when the justification for the remedy no longer exists.
While the Oregon court invoked a criminal contempt statute to affirm
a conviction after the children reached majority, the Texas supreme court in
Ex parte Hooks21 used a statute22 conferring civil contempt power upon the

court in child support cases to obtain the same result. In Hooks the
court held its power to order child support payments terminated when the
child became eighteen, but that its contempt power, under the enforcement
provision, did not terminate but continued beyond age eighteen. Thus, the
statute was interpreted as granting Texas courts a continuing power to enforce child support orders in addition to the inherent power (which terminates with the power to order payment of child support) recognized by the
23
Oklahoma court in Lowry.
The instant case, quoting directly from Lowry, adopts the reasoning of
the Oklahoma court and reaches the same result. 2' An analysis of the Lowry
rationale begins with the court's jurisdiction to issue child support orders.
This jurisdiction is given Florida courts by Florida Statutes, section 61.13.25
Florida courts have consistently held that the statute applies only to minor
children 6 and that the nature of contempt proceedings to enforce child support orders is civil.27 Florida courts have also stated that an order for child
where the court states: "[A] contempt proceeding criminal in nature is instituted solely and
simply to vindicate the authority of the court or otherwise punish for conduct offensive to
the public in violation of an order of the court."
19. State ex rel. Casey v. Casey, 175 Ore. 328, 337, 153 P.2d 700, 703 (1944).
20. In civil contempt proceedings the complainant is the real party in interest with
respect to a remedial order. The court lends its contempt power to give the complainant
an effective remedy. If the complainant becomes disentitled to further benefit of such
order the civil contempt proceedings must be terminated. Harris v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 196
F.2d 88, 90 (7th Cir. 1952); Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 1946).
21. 415 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1967).
22. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4639a (1960) provides: "[A]nd said court may by
judgment, order either parent to make periodical payments for the benefit of such child or
children, until same have reached the age of eighteen (18) years, or said court may enter
a judgment in a fixed amount for the support of such child or children, and such court
shall have full power and authority to enforce said judgments by civil contempt proceedings after ten (10) days notice to such parent of his or her failure or refusal to carry out
the terms thereof .... "
23. 415 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex. 1967).
24. 245 So. 2d 896, 898 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1970, cert. denied, 247 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1971).
25. FLA. STAT. §61.13 (1969) provides: "In any action for divorce or alimony, the court
has power at any stage of the action to make such orders about the care, custody and
maintenance of the children of the marriage, and what security, if any, is to be given
therefor, as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case is equitable."
26. E.g., Bezanilla v. Bezanilla, 65 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. 1953); Perla v. Perla, 58 So. 2d
689, 690 (Fla. 1952); Riley v. Riley, 131 So. 2d 491, 492 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
27. E.g., Ducksworth v. Boyer, 125 So. 2d 844, 845 (Fla. 1960); State ex rel. Byrd v.
Anderson, 168 So. 2d 554, 556 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Dykes v. Dykes, 104 So. 2d 598, 600
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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support is primarily for the benefit of the minor children. 2 Thus, the
premises upon which the Lowry conclusion is based are all present in Florida,

29
and the result that it requires seems consonant with existing public policy.

Despite the desirability of the Lowry rationale, its applicability to the
facts of the instant case seems questionable in light of the jurisdictional
problems posed. It is axiomatic that a court without jurisdiction to issue an

order is without jurisdiction to enforce that order by contempt.30 The issue of
whether the court had jurisdiction to enter the original order to pay child
support did not arise in Lowry nor in the cases relying upon it.31 The instant

decision differs, however, in that the order leading to the contempt citation
was issued after the children reached their majority. In addition, the Florida
child support statute has been interpreted to prohibit original orders for
child support after the children reach their majority.32 Viewed in this manner,
the order incorporating the settlement agreement was invalidly issued; thus,
the court was without jurisdiction to enforce it.33
The instant opinion implies that the respondent countered the jurisdictional argument by contending that even if the court did not have jurisdiction
to enter the order of settlement, the petitioner should be held in contempt

for failure to comply with the order of January 7, 1964, which was issued prior
to either child reaching majority.34 The court, however, found the 1964 order

cancelled by the later order incorporating the settlement agreement. This
finding was based upon the theory that where remedial relief is to be
granted by civil contempt, contempt proceedings terminate with a settlement
28. See City of Jacksonville v. Jones, 213 So. 2d 259 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1968).
29. It has been argued that since unpaid child support constitutes a debt, contempt
citations and resulting imprisonment for failure to make payments violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. FLA. CONsT. art. I, §11. This argument
has been rejected by the Florida supreme court, State ex rel. Krueger v. Stone, 137 Fla.
498, 499, 188 So. 575, 576 (1939).
30. State ex rel. Everette v. Peheway, 131 Fla. 516, 527, 179 So. 666, 671 (1938).
31. In these cases the order to pay child support was based on the final judgment of
divorce. In all instances, the orders were made prior to the children's majority. There was
no reason to question the court's jurisdiction to issue the order since the statutes specifically
granted the courts power to make orders for the support of minor children.
32. Bezanilla v. Bezanilla, 65 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. 1953); Perla v. Perla, 58 So. 2d
689, 690 (Fla. 1952); Riley v. Riley, 131 So. 2d 491, 492 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1961).
33. Notwithstanding the court's lack of jurisdiction to enter orders concerning payment of child support, the court had jurisdiction to enter a lump sum judgment for the
amount of child support in arrears since the arrearages constitute a debt that can be
collected by garnishment, attachment, or execution. Thompson v. Thompson, 142 Fla. 643,
645, 195 So. 571, 572 (1940); Pottinger v. Pottinger, 133 Fla. 442, 446, 182 So. 762, 763
(1938); Boyle v. Boyle, 194 So. 2d 64, 66 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). In Halmu v. Halmu, 247 Wis.
124, 19 N.W.2d 317 (1945) the husband was in arrears for child support payments accrued
before the children reached majority. The wife sought to have the husband held in
contempt but the court, following the rationale of Lowry, refused such an order. The
court did, however, affirm the entry of a lump sum judgment by the lower court. In Smith
v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447, 453, 156 N.E.2d 113, 118 (1959), the court held it was simply
a matter of mathematically calculating the amount due the wife and entering a judgment
for that amount.
34. 245 So. 2d 896, 898 (1st D.CA. Fla, 1970), cert, &nied, 247 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1971).
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